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CONTENTSAbstract
In terms of regulatory and economic capital, credit risk is the most
signi￿cant risk faced by banks. We implement a credit risk model ￿based
on publicly available information ￿ with the aim of developing a tool
to monitor credit risk in a sample of large and complex banking groups
(LCBGs) in the EU. The results indicate varying credit risk pro￿les across
these LCBGs and over time. Furthermore, the results show that large
negative shocks to real GDP have the largest impact on the credit risk
pro￿les of banks in the sample. Notwithstanding some caveats, the results
demonstrate the potential value of this approach for monitoring ￿nancial
stability.
Key words: Portfolio credit risk measurement; stress testing; macro-
economic shock measurement
JEL classi￿cation: C02, C19, C52, C61, E32
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This paper attempts to address the issue of measuring credit risk in the Euro-
pean banking sector using an approach based on publicly available data. For the
ECB this is particularly relevant because although it does not have supervisory
responsibility for individual institutions and consequently access to supervisory
data, it is responsible for contributing to the stability of the European ￿nan-
cial system. By linking publicly available bank exposure data to information
received from a global marcoeconomic model we are able to simulate the e⁄ects
of di⁄erent macroeconomic shocks on corporate sector credit quality/default
probabilities. This enables a model based assessment of credit risk in European
bank portfolios under di⁄erent macroeconomic scenarios and provides a tool for
￿nancial stability scenario analysis.
To run the credit risk model without any scenario analysis we use bank
exposure data, probabilities of default (PD) for each exposure and information
on loss given default (LGD). All of them can be related to the following sectors:
corporates, ￿nancial institution, households and the public sector. Using these
inputs, the credit Value at Risk (VaR) for each single bank is calculated. The
results show that credit risk varies across banks depending on the business lines
pursued as well as their geographical and sector exposures.
The remainder of the paper elaborates on the e⁄ects of macroeconomic
shocks on Value at Risk (VaR) which are calculated in two steps. First, the
impulse responses of the GVAR (Global Vector Autoregression) model to a ￿ve
standard standard deviation shocks in di⁄erent macroeconomic variables are cal-
culated. These shocks include real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), real stock
prices, in￿ ation, short-term and long-term interest rates and the euro-dollar ex-
change rate. In the second step, the results of these macroeconomic shocks are
regressed on the sector speci￿c PD values. The main results from the macro
shocks show that the e⁄ect on credit risk of European banks depends on the
source of the macroeconomic shock as well as the banks loan exposures. Overall,
shocks to real GDP increase the median VaR of banks in the sample the most
from the shocks considered in this paper.
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This paper presents a framework that allows for stress-testing large euro area
banks￿credit risk exposures using publicly available data. In that context, the
impact of a range of shocks generated by a macroeconometric model on banks￿
credit portfolios can be assessed and the relative severity of the shocks can be
ranked in terms of credit value-at-risk.
Credit risk is the risk that a borrower may be unable to repay its debt. The
art of quantifying this risk has advanced markedly since the late 1990s with the
development and dissemination of models for measuring credit risk on a portfo-
lio basis. Typically, this risk can be calculated on the basis of the probability of
default. This can either be based on the fact that a default has occurred accord-
ing to the bank￿ s internal and/or a legal de￿nition, or alternatively, through a
credit rating migration approach. In the former, what matters is that the bor-
rower exceeds some default threshold. By contrast, the latter approach deals
with all mark-to-market gains and losses owing to rating changes, i.e. the migra-
tion from one rating level to another. In this paper, portfolio credit risk refers
to the credit risk arising from loans and other credit exposures included in the
loan items of banks￿￿nancial statements. Other exposures such as structured
products or over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives are not considered due to the
lack of reporting on these type of products. Depending on the size of these
exposures and their risk weight the results of the credit risk estimation could
change.
Broadly speaking, the increased focus on measuring credit risk can be at-
tributed to the following facts. First, advances in analytical methods for imple-
menting credit risk models. Second, incentives provided for quantifying credit
risk accurately in order to allocate capital e¢ ciently within banks. This in-
cludes as well better pricing, due to better valuation of ￿nancial contracts, and
improved fund management, due to better analysis of risk and diversi￿cation.
Third, regulatory developments such as the Basel II Capital Accord. Similar
kinds of models to the one described in this paper also enable a better un-
derstanding of the impact of concentration and diversi￿cation of banks￿overall
credit portfolio risk, and consequently can indicate how economic capital re-
quirements vary depending on how the bank￿ s loan portfolio changes.
As credit risk tends to be the largest source of risk for banks (c.f. ECB
(2007)), any additional tool that could further aid the assessment of credit risk
in EU LCBGs (c.f. ECB (2006))1 would be a useful addition to the ￿nancial
stability monitoring tool kit. This is a pertinent issue for central banks - in-
cluding the ECB - that lack supervisory responsibility and consequently access
to supervisory data on individual institutions. Furthermore, the ECB does not
have widespread access to data on individual loans which could be provided
through sharing of credit register data in the euro area. Notwithstanding these
drawbacks, the usefulness of models based on publicly available data as tools for
￿nancial stability assessment has been noted previously by the IMF, the Bank of
1For a detailed explanation of the term ￿LCBG￿, see Special Feature A in the December
2006 Financial Stability Review of the ECB.
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have used a similar credit risk framework than presented in this paper to assess
the degree of credit risk in four large Swedish banks.2
Moreover, credit risk is the most important risk factor facing banks and ana-
lyzing changes in banks￿loan portfolios as a response to various macro-￿nancial
shocks and scenarios is an important part of risk management, both at the
individual institution and at the systemic level. In spite of recent methodolog-
ical advances, stress testing of infrequently traded credit risk still represents
a challenge owing to complex modelling and data issues. Although stress in
loan portfolios is often caused by macroeconomic shocks, the scale of models
available for ￿nancial ￿rms which link the macro economy to the loan portfolio
level remains limited. In recent years, central banks and supervisory agencies
have also built their own stress testing tools in order to assess the stability of
￿nancial institutions at the systemic level. One area where research has been
carried out is the so-called macro-micro link of credit risk, which bridges the
gap between macroeconometric models and credit quality variables (see Sorge
(2004) for a comprehensive review of the literature on the methodologies of
macro stress-testing). Although it can be argued that ￿ when compared to
models for analysing monetary policy ￿the ￿nancial stress testing models still
represent more art than science, the current state-of-the art in this ￿eld of mod-
elling is nevertheless already rather sophisticated. Plenty of work is ongoing
both within the academic community, the ￿nancial industry and central banks
to further advance the modelling techniques. Recent interest in incorporating ￿-
nancial stability considerations into economic and monetary analysis has further
fuelled the research in this ￿eld.
Figure 1 summarises a commonly applied approach to stress testing by ￿-
nancial ￿rms and central banks. The design of the macroeconomic stress sce-
nario is the ￿rst stage. These scenarios can be simulated using either structural
macroeconomic models designed for macroeconomic forecasts and monetary pol-
icy analysis, reduced-form VAR models or pure statistical methods that model
the multivariate distribution of macro-￿nancial variables using nonlinear de-
pendency structures. In the second stage of the process, macro variables are
mapped to microeconomic indicators of banks￿credit risk, usually by means of
a ￿satellite￿or auxiliary model. Unlike the macroeconomic model, the credit
risk satellite model is often estimated on data at individual bank or even indi-
vidual borrower level. These auxiliary models provide the link between macro-
economic stress scenario conditions and loan performance at the sector or bank
level. The macroeconomic model is then used in the next stage to project the
time path of macro variables under stress conditions. These estimates, in turn,
are fed into the auxiliary credit risk model in order to determine the stressed
credit quality indicators (such as provisions or projected default rates in banks￿
credit portfolios). The ￿nal step of the stress testing process is an assessment of
whether banks can withstand the assumed shock. Depending on the type of the
2For a detailed overview of work that inspired the analysis presented in this paper, see
Riksbank (2006) and Avesani, Liu, Mirestean, and Salvati (2006).
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expressed in terms of a risk metric such as credit value-at-risk.
[Insert here Figure 1: A process for stress testing banks￿credit portfolios]
The current paper contributes to this stream of research in several important
ways. First, it takes advantage of the recent improvements in banks￿￿nancial
disclosure, partly driven by the Pillar III recommendations in the new Basel
II accord, to use publicly available data on banks￿credit risk exposures. This
approach is particularly valuable to analysts and authorities who want to as-
sess the credit risk in a given institution but who have no access to detailed
supervisory information on bank￿ s loan portfolio composition. To this end, we
construct a unique data set on large euro area banks￿loan exposures using in-
formation from banks￿annual reports which is fed into a credit portfolio model
at the individual bank level. Second, we combine this work with a framework
that takes advantage of recent advances in modelling the link between the global
macro-￿nancial environment and micro-level borrower default analysis. Third,
we augment the chosen standard credit portfolio risk model (CreditRisk+) in
such a way that problems related to limited data availability on bank speci￿c
loan portfolios can be mitigated. To this end, we use stochastic loss given default
(LGD) values for back testing of the results and perform simulation exercises
to address the change in volatility of the underlying systematic risk factor as a
response to macroeconomic shocks. The overall system provides a full-￿ edged
framework that can analyse the impact of a wide range of macro-￿nancial shocks
to individual banks￿balance sheets. To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst e⁄ort to
do such an exercise at the euro area level.
In terms of content, this paper ￿rst provides an overview of the main con-
cepts applied in credit risk modelling and the main types of models currently
used by banks for assessing loan portfolio credit risk. It then describes the
implementation of one of these models, CreditRisk+, using publicly available
balance sheet information and data on probabilities of default to construct an
indicator of credit risk among a sample of EU LCBGs. Afterwards, these re-
sults are amended by several stress tests which are conducted using di⁄erent
macroeconomic risk factors. The paper concludes by assessing the usefulness of
this framework as a monitoring tool and identi￿es where additional work could
be undertaken to improve it further.
2 Credit Portfolio Modelling: Some General Con-
cepts
Through their function of intermediating credit in the economy, banks may
experience losses as a result of borrower defaults. These losses can vary over
time and in terms of their magnitude, depending on the number of such incidents
and their severity. There are two useful ways of analysing the losses incurred by
8
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secondly, by examining the individual components of the portfolio.
First, looking at the overall portfolios, banks typically expect to lose a certain
amount on average ￿this amount is called expected loss (EL). They cover EL
by incorporating a risk premium into the interest rate charged to borrowers and
by using loan impairment charges3. Losses that are in excess of expected losses
are termed unexpected losses (UL); institutions are aware that such losses will
occur, but are uncertain as to when these losses may occur and their magnitude.
Therefore, to cover UL, banks have to maintain adequate capital. The amount of
capital held is a function of the bank￿ s management and regulatory requirements,
as well as requirements of external parties such as rating agencies, and the
investors￿view of the bank￿ s risk-return pro￿le. However, holding capital in
excess of these requirements entails an opportunity cost as this money could
otherwise be used to ￿nance additional lending. For this reason, it is important
for banks as well as regulatory authorities to ￿nd the right balance regarding
the optimal level of capital.
The concepts of EL and UL are utilised in the Basel II Capital Accord
published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Among
other goals, the accord seeks to reduce the divergence between the amount of
capital that regulators require and the level that banks want to hold. To quantify
the ideal size of this capital bu⁄er, a portfolio credit risk model can be used to
approximate a level of losses that would be exceeded at a given probability.
Assuming the model used to quantify these losses adequately represents reality,
the required capital value is set in such a way that it ensures that the probability
of unexpected losses exceeding this value is extremely low. Typically, the shape
of a stylised loss distribution of a risky credit portfolio is skewed and has a
relatively fat right tail (see Figure 2). This distribution indicates that losses
less than or around the expected values are most frequent. However, the skew
to the right means more extreme outcomes may also occur, and capital must be
held to cover this possibility.
[Insert here Figure 2: Stylised loss distribution]
The shaded area in Figure 2 depicts the possibility that a bank will not be
able to cover these losses with its capital and pro￿ts. The Value at Risk (VaR)
at the borderline between the shaded and non-shaded area is the threshold
value for which banks may incur a loss greater than that ￿gure at a given
con￿dence interval. Required capital can be set according to the di⁄erence
between the EL and the VaR.4 Assuming that the EL is covered by adequate
risk pricing/impairment charges, the likelihood of a bank￿ s losses exceeding its
3￿Loan impairment charges￿ is the term used in the International Reporting Standards
(IFRS) for loan loss provisions. Under IFRS, banks incur charges for loans with objective
evidence of impairment in their pro￿t and loss account. In practice, banks also tend to set
aside impairment charges for loans that are impaired but not recognised on the basis of past
experience and internal credit portfolio models.
4However, an important drawback of VaR as a single ￿gure in general is that it cannot
explain how much will be lost if an unlikely event does occur.
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con￿dence interval.
A second way of understanding losses on a loan portfolio is by looking at its
individual components. For example, the expected loss of each loan exposure
can be broken down into three components: the probability of default, the
exposure at default, and the loss given default. The probability of not repaying
the loan is called the probability of default (PD). It is important to note that the
average PD of obligors may change over time due to changes in the state of the
economy or company-speci￿c factors. PDs can be inferred from a credit rating,
from a bank￿ s internal database on past default history, from a structural model
of default or from a combination of all three (cf. Crosbie and Bohn (2002)).
The exposure at default (EAD) is the amount outstanding in the event of the
borrower￿ s default. In that case, the loss given default (LGD), i.e. the actual loss
faced by the bank, depends on how much of the original debt can be recovered
through a bankruptcy proceeding and the amount of collateral if available.
Another concept, worth mentioning but not applied in the current frame-
work, is Expected Shortfall (ES). ES allows creating an average or expected
value of all losses greater than the VaR. This can be useful if two portfolios
with the same VaR are compared that might have di⁄erent distributions of their
losses beyond the VaR, in the so called tails of the distributions (cf. Frenkel,
Hommel, and Rudolf (2005)).
3 Brief Review of Commonly Used Models
There are four main vendor credit portfolio models that have been widely im-
plemented by commercial banks.5 These models are used to assess banks￿credit
risk and as input for calculating required regulatory capital standards set down
in the Internal Ratings-based Approach (IRB) introduced by the Basel II Cap-
ital Accord (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001)). While the
various approaches di⁄er, the outputs of these models typically include a prob-
ability of default or a loss distribution for a given default horizon (one year in
most cases).
One model is structural and based on option pricing theory. This approach
builds on the asset valuation model originally proposed by Merton (1974) and is
commercially distributed as Moody￿ s KMV￿ s Credit Monitor. It is known as a
structural model of default as it is based on modelling a ￿rm￿ s value and capital
structure. It links default events to the ￿rm￿ s economic fundamentals (equity
and assets). These default events are endogenous and usually occur when the
￿rm￿ s value reaches a certain lower bound or default threshold.
The next group of models are reduced form models as these do not model
￿rms￿assets or capital structure. These models specify that credit events oc-
cur owing to some type of exogenous statistical process. Reduced form models
5For a more comprehensive review of the industry models see Gordy (2000) and Crouhy,
Galai, and Mark (2000).
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tween rating classes (including default) known as credit migration models; and
(ii) those that specify the default time known as intensity models. The credit
migration approach has been developed by JP Morgan and is commercially im-
plemented as CreditMetrics. This methodology is based on the probability of
moving from one credit quality to another, including default, within a given
time horizon. It is based on an ordered probit model, and uses Monte Carlo
simulation to create a portfolio loss distribution on the horizon date.
Another way of quantifying credit risk is the CreditPortfolioView model de-
veloped by McKinsey, which uses a discrete time multi-period model in which
default probabilities are conditional on the macro variables such as unemploy-
ment, the level of interest rates and economic growth ￿all of which, to a large
extent, in￿ uence the credit cycle in the economy (see also Wilson (1998)).
Finally, CreditRisk+ (CR+) by Credit Suisse Financial Products (CSFP)
uses an actuarial approach, and focuses purely on default. In this model, de-
fault rates are not in absolute levels ￿such as 0.25% for a BBB-rated issuer ￿
but are treated as continuous random variables. Given that most banks have
large numbers of borrowers, some of these borrowers￿default probabilities may
be correlated. Moreover, since borrowers may be concentrated in certain eco-
nomic sectors, it makes sense for a bank to take these factors into account when
assessing the overall level of credit risk or potential losses in its loan portfolio.
In the CR+ model, the default correlations are not modelled with indicators
for regional economic strength or industry-speci￿c weakness but by estimates
of the volatility of the default rate. These estimates are produced by using the
standard deviation of the default rate and are designed to depict the uncertainty
that observed default rates for credit ratings vary over time. This feature allows
a better capturing of the e⁄ect of default correlations and of the long tail in the
portfolio loss distribution given that default correlations induced by external
factors are di¢ cult to observe and may be unstable over time.
The model allows exposures to be allocated to industrial or geographical
sectors as well over varying default horizons. As inputs, data similar to those
required by Basel II are used. The main advantage of the CR+ model is that it
requires a relatively limited amount of data ￿an important consideration when
using publicly available information.
To sum up, each group of models has both advantages and disadvantages,
and successful implementation depends on the speci￿c purpose. Given that
the aim of this paper is to generate a proxy of overall credit risk for a sam-
ple of EU LCBGs, structural models based on their public exposure data, such
as Moody￿ s KMV￿ s default model, cannot readily be applied to some of the
sectors (i.e. the household sector) in order to calculate default probabilities,
as data on equity prices or asset volatilities are not available for this sector.
This is a signi￿cant drawback, as the household sector is one of the main eco-
nomic sectors in LCBGs￿loan portfolios. Given that the ECB only has access
to publicly available data from banks through their quarterly and annual re-
ports, and no rating transition information on individual bank obligors within
loan portfolios, CreditRisk+ and CreditPortfolioView have an obvious appeal
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already macroeconomic variables, which will become relevant for stress testing
(see section 7), the current framework will draw on CreditRisk+ to the estimate
single bank￿ s portfolio VaR, which is neutral to the state of the economic cycle.
4 Theoretical Aspects Related to Credit Port-
folio Modelling in CreditRisk+
The CreditRisk+ model calculates the portfolio losses over a ￿xed horizon ￿
one year in this case ￿for a given con￿dence interval. It does this by using the
frequency of defaults and the losses given these defaults related to all exposures
in the portfolio as inputs. Since default rates can vary over time, the distribution
of defaults is more skewed compared to time-invariant default rates. Moreover,
the default rate distribution a⁄ects the severity of losses because the amount
lost in any default depends on the exposure to any given borrower. Under
these conditions, default for individual loans or bonds is assumed to follow an
exogenous Poisson process. An assumption underlying the CreditRisk+ model
is that the number of defaults occurring in one period is independent of the
defaults in other periods.
CreditRisk+ is modelling default risk. Therefore, the two possible end-of-
period states for each borrower in the model are default and non-default. In
case of a default, a certain part or the entire lender￿ s exposure to the borrower
might be lost. CreditRisk+ allows calculating the distribution of portfolio losses
in a convenient analytical form, i.e. no Monte Carlo simulations are necessary
as in other models of credit risk.
Default correlations in CreditRisk+ are thought of being driven by a vector Q
of risk factors x =(x1;x2;:::;xQ). While it is assumed that defaults of individual
obligors are independently distributed Bernoulli draws, conditional on x. The
conditional probability pi(x) of having a default for borrower i is a function of
the realization of risk factors x, the vector of factor loadings (yi1;:::;yiQ) and
the rating grade G(i) of borrower i. The sensitivity of borrower i to each of the
risk factors is measured by the factor loadings (for a more detailed explanation
of the theoretical foundations of the rest of the section see Credit Suisse First
Boston International (1997) and Grundlach and Lehrbass (2006)).








where pG(i) is the unconditional default probability for a grade G borrower.
6However, it should be noted that for corporate sector exposures, an arti￿cial credit rating
migration matrix could be constructed using Moody￿ s KMV EDF data, making CreditMetrics
an alternative methodology to the one used in this study.
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for the unconditional pG while higher xq (over one) increase the probability of
default for each borrower in proportion to the borrower￿ s weight yiq on that risk
factor and vice versa. All weights yiq have to sum up to one for each borrower
so that E[pi(x)] = p(i) is guaranteed.
From a conceptual perspective CreditRisk+ is not calculating the distribu-
tion of defaults but the probability generating function (PGF) for defaults. We
introduce the PGF Fq(z) of a discrete random variable q as a function of the
auxilliary variable z. This allows us to compute the PGF for a single borrower
as
Fi(zjx) = 1 ￿ pi(x) + pi(x)z = 1 + pi(x)(z ￿ 1): (2)
By using the the following approximation, log(1+y) ￿ y for y ￿ 0; equation
(2) can be rewritten as follows
Fi(zjx) = exp(log(1 + pi(x)(z ￿ 1))) ￿ exp(pi(x)(z ￿ 1)): (4)
This step can be seen as a "Poisson approximation" since the expression
on the right-hand side is the PGF for a Poisson distributed random variable
(pi(x)):
Default events, conditional on x, are independent across obligors; therefore
the PGF of the sum of borrower defaults is the product of the individual PGFs












The unconditional PGF F(z) can be generated by integrating out the x risk
factors. Since the risk factors in CreditRisk+ are assumed to be independent
gamma-distributed random variables with mean one and variance ￿2
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generating function G(z) for losses. The probability generating function for
losses on borrower i is denoted by Gi: While in a portfolio, consisting only of
borrower i, the probability of a loss of v(i) units must equal the probability
that i defaults, having Gi(zjx) = Fi(zv(i)jx): To derive the conditional PGF











pG(i)yiq(zv(i) ￿ 1)]: (7)















G(i) and ￿q and ￿q de￿ned as in equation (6).
As an alternative to this closed-form expression for the PGF it is as well
possible to derive a recurrence relation for computing the distribution of losses
(cf. Credit Suisse First Boston International (1997)).
5 Empirical Implementation Using European Data
Estimating portfolio credit risk models requires various inputs such as historical
exposure data, default rates and their volatilities, and ￿nally LGDs. We use a
version of CreditRisk+ based on a Matlab code originally written by Michael
Gordy from the Federal Reserve Board. Our sample consists of annual data for
the period 2004 to 2005 for 16 EU LCBGs. Due to the fact that several EU
banks were not reporting explicitly about the country of origin and the industry
sector that an exposure relates to we tried to approximate this information on
the following basis. We calculated the average percentage of exposure to all
world regions and industry sectors that we have speci￿ed for this study using 750
country and industry speci￿c exposure information of 16 banks. For aggregate
loan exposure ￿gures in annual reports that had neither a speci￿cation towards
the industry sector nor the country of origin or just one of these two dimensions
missing we assume a uniform distribution, i.e. we split the exposures into the
available entries for each dimension following the average percentage values that
could be calculated from the available data.7
7However, this is only the case for three banks in the sample.
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volatilities for the various economic sectors. These were calculated based on data
provided by Moody￿ s KMV. Time series observations of default probabilities for
households were not available. In this case, default probabilities were used based
on previous work ￿including work by the Basel Committee and on individual
banks￿own estimates of probabilities of default for the household sector. PDs
for each of the 14 sectors were calculated as the median EDF value per time
period and sector. There are further measures of default rates that could be
included in the model. Instead of the Moody￿ s KMV data one could think about
using implied default probabilities extracted from CDS prices broken down by
industry sectors (see Schneider, S￿gner, and Veza (2007)). Since exposure data
are generally not harmonised as each bank has its own de￿nition of various
types of lending, they were mapped to 14 economic sectors to make the data
comparable with the Moody￿ s KMV data.
Furthermore, our portfolio was expanded in order to make it more granular
by assuming 80% of the portfolio was of standard credit quality, with the remain-
ing 20% of the portfolio split equally between higher and lower credit quality
segments. The default probabilities of the lower and higher credit quality por-
tions of the portfolio were also adjusted to re￿ ect the di⁄ering credit qualities.8
A granularity adjustment has already been proposed by the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (2001). There are several theoretical approaches to do
this. Instead of an arti￿cial increase of the number of exposures in our portfolio
we could as well ￿rst calculate the VaR and afterwards adjust this ￿gure by a
so called granularity add-on (cf. Gordy (2003)). The latter is ￿rst estimated
based on a theoretical model and then added to the ordinary VaR estimate.
There are several ways to include LGDs into the VaR estimation. First, we
initially considered exposure speci￿c LGDs based on LGD values from LCBGs￿
annual reports when available. However, as most institutions in the sample
failed to publish the relevant information, we used LGDs based on the Basel
II Capital Accord, and also took into account the experience of practitioners
in commercial banks. As the majority of LGDs in this study can be classi-
￿ed as stressed or ￿economic downturn￿LGDs, according to the ￿fth Basel II
Quantitative Impact Study, the loss distributions for each bank￿ s portfolio may
be more extreme ￿implying higher VaR estimates ￿than those obtained us-
ing through-the-cycle LGDs. However, publicly available data for LGDs on an
industry- and country-speci￿c level are still very limited, and better disclosure
of LGD information would be a useful addition to what ￿nancial institutions al-
ready publish. In this paper, we assume that LGDs stay constant over time and
consequently are not in￿ uenced by sector or macroeconomic shocks (cf.Avesani,
Liu, Mirestean, and Salvati (2006)).
[Insert here Table 1: Stylised credit portfolio example]
Table 1 shows the typical LGDs and default probabilities used in this paper.
8This increase in granularity of the portfolio is based on best practice results (see also
Sveriges Riksbank, op. cit.).
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default for corporate and ￿nancial institutions sectors. Owing to a lack of data
on households, their default probabilities remain constant. A further point to
note is that the largest expected loss in this example ￿ household consumer
credit ￿comes from a relatively small exposure caused by a high LGD and a
high default probability.
Because of the lack of institution-speci￿c LGD information, we use stochastic
LGDs as a robustness check for the VaR estimation.
These are based on the following stochastic beta process
y = f(xja;b) = 1
B(a;b)xa￿1(1 ￿ x)b￿1I(0;1)(x) (9)
where B(￿) is the Beta function. Schuermann (2004) for instance shows
that a beta distribution captures the behaviour of LGDs quite well. The beta
distribution generates values that are nonzero and in the interval ]0 1[ as LGD
values can vary from 0 to 100 percent. We calibrate the parameter estimates
for a and b by using information from other studies on industry sector speci￿c
LGDs. These estimates are then used for the calculation of maximum likelihood
estimates of a and b. The latter are the basis for the creation of the stochastic
beta process that determines the LGD in the VaR estimation. An extention to
this approach could be to include information on the state of the credit cycle
which would then link the LGDs to economic downturn or boom periods.
6 Estimation Results
The following section provides a detailed overview of the results that are ob-
tained by running the CreditRisk+ framework with the data described in the
last section. All estimations are done with either non-random or random LGDs.
In the current implementation of the model, we assume one systematic factor.
The input for this factor is calculated as the volatility of default rates across all
industries and countries for the time period 1992 to 2005. It would be possible
and as well make sense to augment the model by other systematic risk factors
(e.g. di⁄erent industry sectors and their volatility), however but due to the lack
of good data this has not been done in this paper.
As mentioned earlier, in normal conditions banks expect on average to lose
a certain amount (EL) given the composition of their portfolios. Figure 3 shows
how EL varies from one LCBG to the next in the sample expressed as a per-
centage of the overall portfolio size of each bank. From the year 2004 to 2005,
EL decreased for all banks except bank 15, even though the size of the loan
portfolios had expanded during this period. Default probabilities of corporates
and ￿nancial institutions have declined by and large over the sample period
which is the reason for the reduction in EL. Note that default probabilities of
households were kept constant due to the unavailability of data for the sector
but these are unlikely to change substantially from year-to-year.
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size for a sample of large and complex banking groups in the EU]
Figure 4 shows the credit VaR for a sample of EU LCBGs as a percentage of
their total loan portfolios, using a 99.9 percent con￿dence interval. The resulting
VaR can be thought of as the capital in excess of the expected loss that these
LCBGs need to hold to cover unexpected losses from credit risk. This varies
from bank to bank and from year to year. Except for bank 2 and bank 5, VaR
as a percentage of their total loan portfolio is less than ￿ve percent. From 2004
to 2005 this ￿gure has increased for four banks and decreased for seven out
of a sample of 16. Interestingly, in ￿ve cases VaR ￿gures move into di⁄erent
directions from one year to another depending on whether LGDs are stochastic
or not.
[Insert here Figure 4: Credit VaR as a percentage of the total loan portfolio
for a sample of large and complex banking groups in the EU]
To gauge the magnitude of credit risk risk exposures, the credit VaR of each
LCBG portfolio is expressed as a percentage of their total regulatory capital for
the years 2004 and 2005 in Figure 5. The picture here is mixed. Four banks are
indicating a rise with respect to this indicator and ￿ve a decline. All remaining
banks, except for bank 1, show both directions depending on the type of LGD
used for the calculation of the VaR. Two banks, bank 5 and bank 7, indicate
that their total regulatory capital was not su¢ cient to cover the credit risk.
However, for bank 5 this result is in line with the market perception. Bank
5 was rated on a "D" level by Fitch Ratings from 2002 to 2003 and had an
increase to level "C" for 2004 and 2005 while net income tripled from 2004 to
2005.
[Insert here Figure 5: Credit VaR as a percentage of total regulatory capital
for a sample of large and complex banking groups in the EU]
7 Sensitivity Tests
For a ￿nancial stability scenario analysis the linkage between di⁄erent macro-
economic scenarios and the change in credit risk of the banks loans portfolio
is crucial. One way to empirically implement this link is via the PD variable
pi(x): This variable should change after a shock to the underlying economic
system has occurred, keeping all other input variables constant except for the
volatility of the risk factor x. The macroeconometric model used to generate the
macroeconomic shocks is based on DØes, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007).
Linking pi(x) to future macroeconomic developments is a somewhat di¢ cult ex-
ercise. A detailed discussion is included in CastrØn, DØes, and Zaher (2008). In
short, they construct a linking model called a Satellite model. This model links
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the PDs of sector j.
The simplest form of the Satellite model is given by
sjt = bj0+bj1xt+"t; for j = 1;:::k, (10)
where j is the index for sectors, xt is the k￿T matrix of explanatory variables
that are endogenous to the GVAR, sjt is the 1￿T vector of the dependent
variables for sector j, bj0 is the intercept for sector j equation, bj1is a 1￿k
parameter vector and "t is the 1￿T vector of residuals. More clearly, the
estimated Satellite model can be written in the following functional form:
EDFt = ￿ + ￿14GDPt + ￿24CPIt + ￿34EQt + ￿44EPt
+￿54IRt + ￿64LIRt (11)
where ￿ and ￿ denote the parameters and 4GDPt; 4CPIt; 4EQt; 4EPt,
4IRt and 4LIRt denote the logarithmic di⁄erence of euro area real GDP,
CPI in￿ ation, real equity prices, real euro/US dollar exchange rate, short-term
interest rate and long-term interest rate at time t, respectively (cf. CastrØn,
DØes, and Zaher (2008) for a more detailed explanation on the selection of
macroeconomic factors).
Feeding the "macro stressed" implied pi(x) into the CreditRisk+ model
instead of the regular pi(x) that are unconditional on macroeconomic develop-
ments allows a calculation of VaR under di⁄erent stress scenarios. The implied
pi(x) are connected to the unconditional median PDs described earlier in section
5 using the following method.
First, we calculate the percentage change of the non-shocked to the shocked
implied PD in period one of the impulse response function. Then, we increase
the non-shocked PDs by this percentage change (see Table 2 in the Annex
for estimation results of the Satellite model). It should be noted that in this
context there is still no consensus as to whether the or not the volatility of the
PD of the corresponding sector changes also following macroeconomic shock, i.e.
whether there is a higher variation in the number of defaults after a shock and
therefore higher risk of unexpected losses in the loan portfolio. This issue was
recently addressed by Asberg-Sommar and Shahnazarian (2007) who analyzed
the volatility (measured in terms of the standard deviation) in Moody￿ s KMV
EDF data before and after a macro shock. They use a modi￿cation of the
Bassett and Koenker (1982) test, originally developed for detecting the presence
of heteroskedasticity in data, to derive the volatility of the EDF. Following their
study increased EDF do augment the volatility of EDF as well.
In the current model set-up, we assume an increase in the volatility of the
systematic factor following a shock, as we are interested in the potentially VaR
larger measure that this could generate as opposed to assuming no change. The
increase in volatility is computed by extrapolating via a bootstrapping procedure
the asymptotic standard deviation of all stressed PDs that are mapped to our
arti￿cial EU exposures portfolio. The bootstrapping experiment is constructed
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2005 is calculated. Then, the ￿ stressed￿median EDF values that are mapped by
the dimensions sector, sub sector and country to each exposure in the portfolio
are taken and resampled 10.000 times to create 10.000 data sets. After that
the standard deviation for each shocked dataset is calculated. Calculating the
median over these standard deviations gives an asymptotic estimate for the
increase in volatility after a macroeconomic shock has occurred. This procedure
is then replicated for each type of the six shocks that are analyzed.
Due to the lack of information on recovery rates that are one of the two
components of LGDs, there is still a lot of empirical research necessary to ￿gure
out what are the right estimates for recovery rates in di⁄erent industry sectors,
countries and over time9. We assume in this paper that a negative relationship
exists between the default rates and recovery rates along the credit cycle, i.e.
in periods of high default recovery rates are low and vice versa (cf. Altmann,
Resti, and Sironi (2004)). There are several studies that ￿nd that there are no
industry-speci￿c LGDs, which means that recovery rates are independent of the
industry of the borrower. We assume that LGDs are not time varying given the
relatively short time span we use in this paper.
The following describes a simple exercise that was carried out to assess how
credit VaR changes in response to a very large 5 standard error negative shock
to euro area GDP and equity prices, and a similar positive shock to euro area
short- and long-term interest rates, in￿ ation as well as the euro/dollar exchange
rate. Figures 6 and 7 show the change in the level of credit VaR as a percentage
of total regulatory capital for each LCBG in the years 2004 and 2005 when
an extremely large shock to one of the above mentioned macro factors occurs.
Overall, the e⁄ect of these shocks on the credit VaR is larger in 2004. For
some institutions the change was relatively limited or zero, while for others it
was more pronounced owing to the composition of their loan portfolios as well
as the default probabilities of the borrowers in their portfolios. It is unclear
whether this is a result of the structure of the loan portfolio exposure data or
the probability of default proxy being adequate enough to capture the e⁄ects
of the macroeconomic shock that the bank is exposed to. This is left for future
research. From 2004 to 2005 the median and interquartile range have decreased
signi￿cantly in case of a shock to equity prices and the euro. In both years a
negative shock to GDP has the largest impact on credit VaR and a shock to the
euro exchange rate the lowest. Except for shocks to equity prices and the euro,
for both years in the maximum credit VaR is larger than Tier 1 capital.
[Insert here Figures 6 and 7: Change in credit VaR as a percentage of Tier 1
capital following a ￿ve standard error negative shock to several macro variables
for a sample of large and complex banking groups in the EU (2004, 2005)]
Comparing these results to the method of calculating VaR with stochastic
LGDs for the years 2004 and 2005 reveals that again for the year 2004 shocks
9LGD is de￿ned as (exposure * (1 - recovery rate).
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exceeded the Tier 1 capital threshold of one institution; this was related to its
weak ￿nancial position at the time. In both years 2004 and 2005 negative shocks
to GDP and equity prices have the strongest impact on VaR while all other
shocks have a similar impact level. However, in the year 2005 the maximum
VaR is either equal to Tier 1 capital for the case of negative shock to GDP
and equity prices or around 80 percent. Again a negative shock to equity prices
seems to have the lowest impact on VaR looking at the median value.
[Insert here Figures 8 and 9: Change in credit VaR as a percentage of Tier
1 capital following a ￿ve standard error negative shock to several macro vari-
ables for a sample of large and complex banking groups in the EU (2004, 2005;
stochastic LGDs)]
Tables 5 to 8 provide descriptive statistics on the results depicted in Figures
6 to 9. An explanation for the reported equality in median VaR ￿gures under
di⁄erent scenarios is that shocks to di⁄erent macroeconomic factors can result
in similar elasticities with regard to sector speci￿c PDs (see Table 2). As a
consequence, median VaR estimates can be in a similar range.
[Insert here Tables 5 to 8: VaR changes following di⁄erent macroeconomic
shocks (2004, 2005; non-stochastic and stochastic LGDs)]
Given that relatively conservative assumptions were used for LGDs as well
as default probabilities, it is likely that the estimates presented in this paper
could overestimate credit risk in these LCBGs￿portfolios. On average, the VaR
values reacted to some extent to the changes in LGDs but remained in a similar
range to non-stochastic LGDs. The variability in credit VaR appeared to be
mainly driven by di⁄erences in the distribution of loan exposures across the
institutions covered in the current sample of LCBGs and their corresponding
PDs. However, the e⁄ects of simultaneous increases in LGDs and PDs have
not been explored extensively in the academic literature with the exception of
Altman (2006). In the current version of the paper, we have not attempted this
exercise.
Finally, an additional plausibility check was carried out by comparing the
VaR estimates with the economic capital for credit risk held by those LCBGs
that had published such ￿gures. Encouragingly, the estimates using the current
model tended to be in a similar range to the institutions￿own economic capital
￿gures.
Three explanations can be advanced for the slight di⁄erences in these esti-
mates from those of the current model and the institution￿ s estimates. First,
better input data were available to the institutions themselves, including in-
formation on collateral for their exposures. Second, intra-group diversi￿cation
e⁄ects were taken into account in the institutions published ￿gures, making their
￿gures lower compared to the estimates in this paper. Third, some institutions
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posures and these ￿gures were not included in the current model to the extent
that they were disclosed separately.
8 Information disclosure and the Pillar III of
the Basel Capital Accord
A lack of a complete set of information required as data inputs has been a
long standing problem in the credit risk modelling of loan portfolios. While
banks began to systematically compile information for the development, imple-
mentation, and regulatory approval of internal credit risk models several years
ago, in practice very little quantitative information is actually disclosed to the
public in either annual reports or quarterly earnings reports. There are three
main problems for the purposes of this paper. First, the majority of LCBGs
do not make a geographical distinction in their loan exposure ￿gures using in-
ternational statistical classi￿cation systems. In some cases, it is di¢ cult to
determine the geographical distribution of loan exposures of the same LCBGs.
Second, only a minority of banks provide some quantitative information about
how they calculate expected and unexpected losses ￿such as probabilities of
default on their internal rating scales ￿which determines whether impairment
charges are made or not as well as overall economic capital estimates. However,
most include somewhat vague qualitative descriptions in their ￿nancial state-
ments or provide additional information on the sources of credit risk in separate
presentations. Third, only a minority of LCBGs in the sample show in their
annual reports a breakdown of their overall impairment ￿gures by geographic
region and/or business line, indicating where the sources of current credit losses
originate from. Notwithstanding the transition to IFRS, as well as Pillar 3 re-
quirements from Basel II, additional quantitative and qualitative information
could aid the interpretation of how credit risk is calculated and would prove
more useful for assessing the credit quality of euro area LCBGs. More encour-
agingly, this aspect of euro area LCBGs￿￿nancial disclosures may be improved
by the implementation of IFRS 7 for 2007 full year ￿nancial results that will
be published in 2008, as this requires particular disclosures concerning credit
risk for loans and other ￿nancial instruments incurring credit risk. In partic-
ular, IFRS 7 (￿Financial instrument disclosures￿ ) contains various disclosure
requirements for credit and other risks. Among the requirements for credit risk,
banks should provide information about their maximum credit risk exposures
on the balance sheet, collateral and other credit enhancements, information on
assets that are not past due or impaired and various other disclosures ￿such as
vintage and how assets were deemed to be past due and/or impaired.10
10See box 12 of the June 2007 ECB Financial Stability Review for more information on
credit risk disclosures by euro area LCBGs.
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This study has described the analytical concepts underpinning credit risk mod-
elling, and has implemented a credit risk model that seeks to gauge the credit
risk pro￿les of a sample of EU LCBGs. To do so it uses publicly available expo-
sure data from EU LCBGs￿annual reports, together with several other inputs.
While the sample is comparatively limited, the model nevertheless produces
some relatively plausible results given the restricted inputs.
Overall Tier 1 capital provision of EU LCBGs seems to be in the right
ballpark. The development from one year to another reveals that LCBGs VaR
￿gures as a percentage of Tier 1 capital change without following a speci￿c
pattern. However, there are some di⁄erences between VaR ￿gures that are
calculated on the basis of stochastic LGDs or sector speci￿c LDGs.
Results from stress testing show shocks to macro factors have had a larger
impact in the year 2004 compared to 2005. In both settings, stochastic vs.
sector speci￿c LGDs, and years the most pronounced impact on credit VaR is
coming from a negative shock to GDP. The interquartile range of the reaction
of VaR lies between zero and 40 for all shocks revealing that 75 percent of the
banks could probably withstand any of these shocks.
Limitations to the current framework are the out-of-sample operation of the
GVAR as well as a potentially non-linear relationship between the EDF and the
explanatory variables of the GVAR which is not yet considered in the Satellite
model. In addition to that, model uncertainty plays a vital role regarding the
interpretation of the results. First, there is uncertainty about the parameters
used in the model; second, uncertainty about the serial correlation properties of
shocks; and third uncertainty about data quality.
Two additional re￿nements could probably enhance the results further. First,
a more thorough disclosure of exposure information by LCBGs in their annual
and quarterly reports would improve the main input and, consequently, the VaR
estimates. Second, better information and analysis on LGD values, especially
on how they interact with PDs in a downturn, could prove extremely useful in
re￿ning the outputs of this models. These improvements may further increase
the usefulness of this tool for ￿nancial stability monitoring.
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Figure 1: A process for stress testing banks' credit portfolios 
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Figure 4: VaR as a percentag of the total loan portfolio 
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February 2009Table 1: Stylised credit portfolio example 
 
Sector Exposure LGD Loss value Probability of Default Expected loss
(EUR millions) (%) (EUR millions) (% probability) (EUR millions)
Corporate 1062 0.38 404 0.02 8.08
Corporate 4740 0.20 948 0.02 18.96
Corporate 1066 0.27 288 0.02 5.76
Bank 276 0.20 55 0.01 0.55
Household 10598 0.13 1378 0.01 13.78
Household 1776 0.47 835 0.04 33.40
Public 596 0.30 178 0.001 0.17  
 
Source: ECB (2007), “Assessing portfolio credit risk in a sample of EU large and complex banking 
groups”, Special Feature C, Financial Stability Review, June. 
 
 
Table 2: The Satellite model estimation for median EDFs (1992:Q1-2005:Q4) 
 
   Const  GDP  INFL  EQUITY EP  IR 
Adjusted R-
squared 
Aggr 0.853  -0.350  -0.054  -0.018 -0.028 -0.010  0.377 
P-value  0.000 0.040 0.823 0.020 0.077 0.228     
                
BaC  0.663 -0.285 0.161 -0.014 -0.012 -0.007  0.470 
P-value  0.000 0.006 0.268 0.003 0.198 0.146     
                
Cap  1.167 -0.465 -0.097 -0.022 -0.034 -0.011  0.371 
P-value  0.000 0.030 0.749 0.025 0.089 0.268     
                
CCY  0.679 -0.266 0.018 -0.015 -0.017 -0.006  0.417 
P-value  0.000 0.022 0.915 0.005 0.120 0.270     
                
CNC  0.520 -0.117 -0.100 -0.010 -0.012 -0.003  0.267 
P-value  0.000 0.235 0.485 0.026 0.206 0.558     
                
ENU  0.160 -0.047 0.031 -0.005 -0.002 0.000  0.406 
P-value  0.000 0.080 0.421 0.000 0.332 0.737     
                
Fin  0.168 -0.030 0.081 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001  0.469 
P-value  0.000 0.118 0.005 0.001 0.196 0.404     
                
TMT  2.385 -1.179 -0.831 -0.062 -0.135 -0.038  0.328 
P-value  0.006 0.108 0.433 0.066 0.052 0.272     
 
Source: Castrén, Dées and Zaher (2008). 
Note: EP stands for euro/US dollar real exchange rate and IR for short term interest rate. The 
parameters are expressed in logs and they can be interpreted as elasticities. The last column presents 
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ge rate Inflation 
quartile 1 9048 9575 8932 8932 7531 8683
minimum 3621 3621 3621 3621 3018 3621
median 12091 12428 11415 11415 10885 11415
maximum 26914 26914 26914 26914 22579 26914
quartile 3 21343 21343 20570 20570 17362 20570










ge rate Inflation 
quartile 1 18 18 18 18 10 17
m i n i m u m 999909
median 24 26 22 22 17 22
maximum 128 128 128 128 77 128
quartile 3 42 42 36 36 25 35










ge rate Inflation 
quartile 1 12 12 11 11 7 11
m i n i m u m 777707
median 17 19 15 15 12 15
m a x i m u m 7 67 67 67 64 67 6
quartile 3 24 25 20 20 15 20  
 
Note: All statistics are computed over a sample of 16 LCBGs. The shock size for each macro variable 
is 5 standard deviations. 
 
 










ge rate Inflation 
quartile 1 8345 9020 8379 8379 8345 8379
minimum 4459 4459 4459 4459 4459 4459
median 10749 12519 11789 11789 10749 11789
maximum 23472 42250 30178 30178 23472 30178
quartile 3 21351 25205 24401 24401 21351 24401










ge rate Inflation 
quartile 1 0 9 8 8 0 4
m i n i m u m 000000
median 10 19 15 15 10 15
maximum 70 117 117 117 70 117
quartile 3 19 35 23 23 19 23










ge rate Inflation 
quartile 1 0 6 5 5 0 3
m i n i m u m 000000
m e d i a n 71 3 1 1 1 171 1
m a x i m u m 4 57 57 57 54 57 5
quartile 3 12 24 14 14 12 14  
 
Note: All statistics are computed over a sample of 16 LCBGs. The shock size for each macro variable 
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Table 4: VaR changes following different macroeconomic shocks, 2004 
Table 5: VaR changes following different macroeconomic shocks, 2005 stochastic LGDs 










ge rate Inflation 
quartile 1 8451 8451 8451 8451 8451 8451
minimum 2869 2869 1913 1913 1913 2869
median 12574 12574 11902 11902 11229 11902
maximum 27339 27339 27339 27339 23922 27339
quartile 3 15111 15111 15111 15111 14891 15111










ge rate Inflation 
quartile 1 17 17 15 15 11 15
m i n i m u m 660006
median 26 26 24 24 21 24
maximum 114 114 114 114 103 114
quartile 3 33 33 32 32 29 32










ge rate Inflation 
quartile 1 11 11 11 11 8 11
m i n i m u m 440004
median 17 17 16 16 15 16
m a x i m u m 6 86 86 86 86 16 8
quartile 3 23 23 22 22 20 22  
Note: All statistics are computed over a sample of 16 LCBGs. The shock size for each macro variable 
is 5 standard deviations. 
 
stochastic LGDs 










ge rate Inflation 
quartile 1 8006 8006 7739 7348 7739
minimum 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999 3999
median 14526 14526 13412 13412 12943 13412
maximum 28679 28679 26289 26289 23899 26289
quartile 3 17773 17773 17662 17662 15599 16958










ge rate Inflation 
quartile 1 12 12 9 10 7 9
m i n i m u m 000000
median 19 19 14 15 11 14
maximum 101 101 81 81 81 81
quartile 3 33 33 26 26 20 22










ge rate Inflation 
quartile 1 8 8 6 8 4 6
m i n i m u m 000000
median 12 12 10 10 8 9
m a x i m u m 6 56 55 25 25 25 2
quartile 3 24 24 19 19 14 16  
 
Note: All statistics are computed over a sample of 16 LCBGs. The shock size for each macro variable 
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